Tajfun

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  1. Suzbijanje Turaka POSLE povlaèenja carice Jelene u manastir, što je po svim izgledima uèinila dragovoljno, despot Uglješa postaje samostalni gospodar Serske oblasti. Glavna briga despota Uglješe u to vreme bila je suzbijanje sve ekspanzivnijih Turaka Osmanlija, koji su veæ preotimali gradove zapadno od prestonice nemoæne Vizantije. Tako su Turci pored Didimotike i Andrijanopolja, zauzeli Jedrene i Plovdiv. U Jedrene su preneli svoju prestonicu i vršili brzu kolonizaciju Trakije. Od Vizantijskog carstva ostali su samo Carigrad sa obližnjom okolinom, Solun i Moreja (Peloponez). Turci su na ovaj naèin doprli do Serske oblasti i njihov sukob sa Uglješom postao je neizbežan. Njegove opsežne pripreme za rat bile su vojne i diplomatske. Pokušavajuæi da privuèe Vizantiju kao saveznika, izrazio je spremnost da Carigradskoj patrijaršiji prizna jurisdikciju nad celom svojom oblašæu. Javno je osudio crkvenu politiku cara Dušana, odlazio je u Svetu goru i tamo delio bogate poklone, ali ni to mu nije pomoglo. Pored Vizantije, Uglješa je pokušao da u borbi s Turcima naðe saveznika i u Bugarskoj, ali zbog postojeæeg stanja, nije ništa ozbiljnje preduzeto da se stane na put turskoj ekspanziji. Vizantijski car Jovan Peti je molio papu, Mletaèku republiku i Maðarsku da mu pruže pomoæ, ali je sve to bilo uzalud, jer razjedinjena Evropa, i sama u meðusobnom trvenju, još uvek nije bila svesna turske opasnosti, ni spremna da se ozbiljnije angažuje na njihovom suzbijanju. Svojim smelim upadima turski odredi su prodirali na sever, u Rodopsku oblast, skretali u Sersku oblast i prema Atosu, gde su se nalazili bogati svetogorski manastiri. Despot Uglješa je ulagao velike napore i u prvo vreme uspešno suzbijao sve turske prodore. Kada je video potpunu vizantijsku nemoæ, on je, doèekujuæi turske odrede i progoneæi ih na istok, sve više prodirao u slabo branjene oblasti Vizantije, pa je njima ovladao i tako znatno proširio granice svoje oblasti. Meðutim, voðenje borbi sa sve brojnijim i agresivnijim Turcima je iscrpljivalo Uglješine snage, pa je on, šaljuæi svoja poslanstva i lièno odlazeæi na pregovore, ulagao nove napore da privoli Vizantiju i Bugarsku na zajednièku borbu. U vezi s ovim, u maju 1371. godine došlo je do sporazuma o objedinjavanju dveju crkava na štetu Srpske patrijaršije. Taj sporazum je obavezivao samo Srbe na Uglješinoj teritoriji. Što se tièe vojne saradnje, Carigrad je izbegavao da se na ovome obavezuje, jer je, i pored Uglješinog uspešnog otpora Turcima, sumnjao u moæ razjedinjene srpske države. Više se uzdao u bogati zapad (Mletaèka republika, Ðenova, Maðarska, Francuska), gde je uzaludno slao svoje mnogobrojne misije tražeæi novac i vojnu pomoæ. Novi bugarski car Šišman sa sedištem u Trnovu, i pored èestih upada turske vojske na podruèje njegove države, oseæajuæi nemoæ, nije bio za to da se zameri turskom sultanu Muratu, koji je tada bio na vlasti, odnosno da zajedno sa Srbima i Vizantincima vodi borbu protiv Turaka. Nadao se da æe s njima uskoro uspostaviti neki ugovorni odnos (ovo se i ostvarilo), ali je za svaki sluèaj preduzimao vojne pripreme i dodatno utvrðivao svoju prestonicu. Videvši da od zajednièke akcije Srba, Bugara i Vizantinaca nema ništa, despot Uglješa se na kraju odluèio da pozove u pomoæ brata Vukašina Mrnjavèeviæa, s kojim je bio u veoma dobrim odnosima. Ne može se pouzdano utvrditi kako se prema tom pitanju držala moæna vlastela u tzv. grèkim zemljama, odnosno da li je Uglješa pokušavao da i njih angažuje za ovu borbu. Meðutim, sasvim je izvesno da srpska vlastela u starim srpskim zemljama nije bila u dobrim odnosima sa braæom Mrnjavèeviæ zbog meðusobnih sukoba oko teritorija i da ih ne bi podržala u ovoj borbi. OBRAÈUNI KRALj Vukašin doneo je definitivnu odluku da se do kraja obraèuna sa županom Nikolom Altomanoviæevm koji je èesto vršio provokacije prema njegovim severnim oblastima i pravio mu smetnje za njegovu dalju ekspanziju prema severu. U ovom cilju on je oezbedio pomoæ svoga zeta Ðurða Balšiæa, gospodara Zete. Prikupio je vojsku i doveo je pod Skadar, gde je oèekivana naruèena dubrovaèka flota koja je trebalo da prebaci vojsku prema Nikolinim zemljama. (Nastavlja se)
  2. Od stavioca do kneza VEŠT i sposoban, Vukašin je uspeo da se toliko nametne caru Urošu, da ga je ovaj proglasio za despota, da bi 1365. godine Vukašin bio proglašen za kralja Srba i Grka i savladara caru Urošu. prema tadašnjoj vizantijskoj praksi koja je primenjivana i na srpskom dvoru, istovremeno s Vukašinovim proglašenjem za kralja, njegov sin Marko, tada pisar na dvoru cara Uroša, proglašen je za mladog kralja, a Vukašinov brat Uglješa za despota. Malo-pomalo, Vukašin je u doba vladavine cara Uroša proširio svoje teritorije i na druge oblasti, tako da je ovladao Skopljem, Prištinom, Novim Brdom i Prizrenom, pa se njegova vladavina prostirala u prilepskoj, prizrenskoj, pološkoj i skopskoj oblasti, Poreèu, Kuèevu, Prespi i Hlerinu, kao i delu Kosova, a u Prištinu je preneo svoju prestonicu. U ovom periodu Lazar Hrebeljanoviæ službuje na dvoru cara Uroša kao stavilac, gde piše povelje i obavlja ostale poslove dvorske kancelarije, verno služeæi caru Urošu. Mada se pominje u nekim dokumentima (uoèi mira u Onogoštu izmeðu Vojislava Vojinoviæa i Dubrovèana 1362. i sledeæe, 1363. godine, u vezi s razmenom poseda èelnika Muse i Vojislava Vojinoviæa), ništa posebno se ne istièe i nalazi se u senci oblasnih gospodara. LAZAR Hrebeljanoviæ je završio dvorsku službu kod cara Uroša po svoj prilici 1365. godine u najnižem dvorskom zvanju stavioca. Imao je tada oko 36 godina. Nema pouzdanih podataka kada je i kako postao knez penjuæi se do ove titule od zvanja stavioca, što je sluèaj i sa Vojislavom Vojinoviæem. Ne zna se ni sa kojom baštinom je raspolagao na poèetku svoga knezovanja. Titula kneza u srednjovekovnoj Srbiji nije bila dovoljno odreðena i ustaljena. Nosili su je braæa Stefana Nemanje, Stracimir i Miroslav. U doba razvijenog feudalizma ona je reðe dodeljivana i bila je niža od vojvode. Tek u doba opadanja moæi centralne vlasti (raspada Dušanovog carstva) vraæa se ugled ovoj tituli i nose je dve istaknute liènosti, Vojislav Vojinoviæ i Lazar Hrebeljanoviæ, od kojih je ovu titulu prvo dodio Lazar, pa docnije Vojislav. Iako je titulu kneza Lazar Hrebeljanoviæ, najverovatnije, imao od 1365. godine, ona je prvi put zabeležena u saèuvanim dokumentima, tek, u aprilu 1371. godine. Ovu titulu, kao i kneževsku baštinu, Lazaru je za svoje zasluge i dokazanu sposobnost mogao dodeliti samo car Uroš. Što se prvobitne baštine tièe, knez Lazar je nije mogao imati oko Prilepca, kao mesta svog roðenja, jer je u to vreme kralj Vukašin držao ovo odruèje kao svoj posled. POLAZEÆI od baština tadašnjih feudalnih gospodara na podruèju tzv. srpskih zemalja, oblast kneza Lazara Hrebeljanoviæa na kojoj je on otpoèeo da se osamostaljuje, mogla se prostirati izmeðu oblasti kralja Vukašina Mrnjavèeviæa na jugu, oblasti Rastislaliæa na severoistoku (Branièevo) i oblasti kneza Vojislava Vojinoviæa, kasnije Nikole Altomanoviæa na severozapadu. Na severozapadnoj strani Lazareve oblasti, u to doba stupio je na istorijsku scenu župan Nikola Altomanoviæ, koji je vladao zapadno od Rudnika. Posle smrti svoga strica Vojislava Vojinoviæa (septembar 1363. godine), mladi, ambiciozni, neobièno hrabri i nepromišljeni Nikola je do 1365. godine preoteo sve posede Vojislava Vojinoviæa od njegove žene Goislave i njihovih sinova, koje je strpao u tamnicu, a ubrzo je u želji za preotimanjem poseda i nametanjem svoje vlasti, došao u sukob sa Dubrovnikom i skoro svim svojim susedima. Neko vreme car Uroš i Vukašin su dobro saraðivali, zajednièki kovali novac, vodili spoljnu politiku i izvodili druge akcije, o èemu je saèuvano niz dokumenata. No, ti njihovi dobri odnosi kasnije su poèeli da se kvare. Iako je bio savladar caru Urošu, Vukašin se nije zadovoljio s postojeæim proširenjem svoje oblasti, veæ je težio da ide dalje ka severu, naroèito u kosovskoj oblasti i poèeo da ugrožava zemlje Lazara Hrebeljanoviæa i Nikole Altomanoviæa. SUKOBI NA KOSOVU PO Mavru Orbinu, Vukašin je ozbiljno ugrozio i prihode od carina caru Urošu, koji je skoro ostao bez njih. Radi svega ovoga Lazar Hrebeljanoviæ i Nikola Altomanoviæ, koji su bili u dobrim odnosima sa carem Urošem, ubede cara da zajedno skupe vojsku i krenu na Vukašina, obeæavši mu sve što od njega oduzmu. Do sukoba je došlo na Kosovu, i tom prilikom je Vukašinu pristigao u pomoæ s vojskom brat Uglješa. Videvši da je sigurna pobeda na strani braæe Mrnjavèeviæ, Lazar se na vreme povukao, a s vojskom je ostao i produžio borbu car Uroš i Nikola Altomanoviæ. Vojska braæe Mrnjavèeviæ razbila je vojsku cara Uroša, zarobila cara s nešto pratnje, koju su pustili, a Nikola Altomanoviæ, koji je izgubio gro svoje vojske, uspeo je bekstvom da se spase.
  3. In Place of an Epilogue "All have perished Now the future comes" Andrej Platonov, Cavengur After several years of war in different parts of the former Yugoslavia, yet one more person has been found who is offering war as a solution. Has the worst possible solution ever served as a solution? How to understand that someone could, nevertheless, be so susceptible to illusions that he suggests that a relatively small national minority wage a war against a significantly more numerous nation? That taxes both common sense and the imagination. War? Are horrors really so easily forgotten? Have the dead, the wounded, the destroyed homes, the refugees, the desperation, the tears, the suffering really vanished from memory? If the call to resolve the problem by war had come from just one man, one part of the world would have proclaimed him irresponsible and sick and the other would not have paid much attention to that kind of behaviour. That man, however, was not alone, he did not speak only in his name, he uttered this in the name of many of his co-nationals who would respond to such a call. We are confident in our knowledge of this because we have seen them and got to know them at the many protest meetings, sometimes, after Tito's death, with his pictures at the head of the processions, sometimes with the flags of neighbouring Albania and sometimes even with the insignia of the great and powerful countries of this world. Symbols have always been blasphemously adapted to the situation at the time and to political needs. These young people, also bewitched by intoxicating but airy promises, would hurl themselves into war, ignorant of what war brings in its wake. One should recall that well known saying which warns that it is dangerous to stir up a hornet's nest. Yugoslavia today is reminiscent of a damaged hornet's nest. It has been damaged by the very people whom it helped liberate from the domination of others but who have now realised their independence at the expense of Yugoslavia. Its people have been unjustly mistreated and the state blackmailed with sanctions. The UN, whose purpose and aim is to unite peoples, has excluded Yugoslavia, one of its founding members, from its ranks. It has excluded it from a large number of international organisations and associations in defiance of all logic, designating it as an aggressor but the present Yugoslavia has not taken part in this war. Finally (?), the United States, an ally in both World Wars, in the words of its president, has accused Yugoslavia of representing a threat to US national security. How can one interpret this artificial and fabricated construction? As the arrogance of the unlimited all-powerful or as the weakness of the unsure and limitedly independent? Far too many accusations laid at the door of a numerically and territorially modest remnant of a one-time not so large state and just as much injustice. It is well known that the scream arising from injustice is very painful. That pain is approaching the highest possible threshhold point. The threat of war against such a damaged people is the drop which fills the glass and a war thus launched would represent that intolerable blow which could not go unanswered. About the war which would then follow we dare not think - it would be fearful if it came. Let us remember the thoughts of the Russian writer, Platonov, and understand that there is no future for the dead.
  4. At the Crossroad The present period in Yugoslavia has been marked by the secession of Slovenia and Croatia, the latter including territory where Serbs formed the majority, the separation of Macedonia and the attempt to impose an Islamic government in a Bosnia and Hercegovina still in the grip of a war whose outcome is uncertain. The republics of Serbia and Montenegro have decided to remain in Yugoslavia and so they are continuing to call their joint community Yugoslavia. Within this new constellation, the Shiptar national minority for the most part find themselves in the new Yugoslavia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The percentage of Shiptars in the other former Yugoslav republics is far less significant than that in Yugoslavia, a fact which has guided the direction of Shiptar activities. With reference to this comment let us be permitted to point out one essential but, nevertheless, unnoticed and unmentioned detail which will enable us to acquire a clear idea and concept and, perhaps, even reach new conclusions about the reasons and aims which guided the leaders of the Shiptar political organisations in the choice of direction of their activities. Let us recall the views expressed in the chapter "It is also a question of names" in which we extensively detailed the Albanian and, consequently, the Shiptar, aspiration for contemporary Albanians to be represented as the direct descendants of the Illyrians. Let us permit ourselves at this point to add some additional details. Let us establish first of all where the Illyrian homeland was according to scientific and, especially, cartographic sources. We shall make use of the most reliable as possible sources in order to establish the location of the Illyrians. The first two "proved" their objectivity in the years of their publication, that is, at a time when the Albanian national territory had still not been marked out, that is, when the Albanian state was still not in existence. Under discussion are the historical atlases of Kuipert 29 and Sieglin 30, the former published in 1884 and the latter in 1893. Together with them are two contemporary historical atlases of Italian origin whose selection is justified by the fact that, after the Roman victory over the Illyrians, the Illyrian lands were incorporated within the Roman empire. Since these are reliable historical facts, it is only logical that the victors knew where and what they had conquered. The Italian atlases used are the Atlante storico and Atlante storico ilustrato. Map 11: Authentic area of Illyria according to Sieglin (left top) Map 12. Authentic area of Illyria from "Atlante storico illustrate" At the first glance (only two maps are included in this electronic edition) it is noticeable that the maps from all four sources precisely and identically show the area inhabited by the Illyrian tribes from the third century BC to the second century AD to have been located along the eastern shore of the Adriatic sea, that is, in that part which would for centuries after that time bear the name "Dalmatia". That transitional period is even marked in the Atlante storico from Novara with the two-fold name of Illyria and Dalmatia. Before we consider the essence of the facts presented, it is worth taking a look at one more. Not one of the cited maps locates the Illyrians within the interior of the Balkan peninsula - marked there are the Thracians, Dardan, Macedonians, Epirotes, Tribals etc., that is, Pannonia, Moesia Superior and other places. If the sources, whose credibility we have established, point to the fact that the ancient Illyrian territory was in a north-westerly direction, along the Adriatic coast, while contemporary Albanian factors are attempting to prove an unbroken Illyrian-Albanian continuity, then the logical question arises -how is it that the so-called "true successors" of the IIlyrians are not oriented towards their original homeland which the author of this book does not even by chance suggest since his ideas are not slanted in that direction nor guided by that logic) but towards regions eastward of the so-called original Illyrian territory, that is, towards Serbia, Greece, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro. However, that orientation, in fact, expansionism, is not equally displayed nor seen with the same purpose. In fact it would also have really been in accordance with the nationalist concept of Blut und Boden ("blood and soil") if the Albanian chauvinists had turned towards the northwest, that is, to the "old lands", but the fact that they have not is probably the result of an analysis of the geopolitical situation, historical conditions and circumstances in the Balkans. Flowery propaganda conducted from greed won the day. Even a superficial analysis shows that during the time of the first Albanian attempts at expansion in the nineteenth century, in the period of the first League of Prizren, almost all of the "original homeland" of the Illyrians was under the rule of Austro-Hungary, then one of the most powerful countries in Europe and second only to the Ottoman empire in the Balkans, which a priori made any campaign in the direction of Illyria, that is, Dalmatia, impossible. The situation within that empire, however, apparently offered certain hopes for national autonomy within its framework if the Turks should so allow but, as is well known, not only did the Turks not so allow but they also came down vengefully hard on the Albanian leadership and people. In short, in neither one nor the other case was there any possibility or chance of the realisation of Albanian aims. On the other hand, the already mentioned descent of the shepherds and, after the Turkish invasion, the poverty-stricken inhabitants of Albania into the Kosovo and Metohia valley which coincided with the Turkish taking of the Balkans and the Islamization of the Albanians was clearly carried out for the purpose of using and possessing pasture-land. That gradual descent of the Albanians into lands populated by Serbs opened the way for their later penetration into Kosovo and Metohia. After all, this was also a precondition for the announcement of those pretensions which today are very real. 32 It has already been mentioned that the attitude of the Albanian and Shiptar expansionists is different for each of their neighbours. Representatives of the Albanian people fairly frequently proclaim what those specific approaches are when they make statements abroad and in contacts with the press. When peace and the resolution of the ethnic, confessional and civil war in Bosnia and Hercegovina is being discussed in this country, that role is given to the former head of the Communist party in Kosovo. He has been explicit "... The only solution is the separation of Kosovo from Serbia and the creation of our own republic!" As far as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is concerned, he also offers an uncompromising solution according to which it is possible "... to resolve the Albanian issue only by recognising the Albanian in this republic as completely equal with the Macedonian people, acknowledging both peoples as state-constituting peoples!" Let us, nevertheless, not forget that wing of the Albanian Macedonians which has already proclaimed a separate Albanian state in Macedonia, calling it "Ilirida". The "recipe" for Montenegro runs thus: "...the Albanian people must have a single political territorial autonomy for all those districts where Albanians form a majority of the population!" and, according to the "recipe", these are a part of Podgorica (the capital of Montenegro!?), Plav, Gusinje, Rozaje, Ulcinj, Tuzi and Bar. An opportunity has not arisen for the person in question to announce the "solution" for Greece but this is because it has been known from earlier that the Albanians consider that Northern Epirus which they call Qameria should belong to them. In normal circumstances these kinds of views, so openly and unhesitatingly expressed, should not even be mentioned because they are in contradiction both with the principles upon which the United Nations are founded and with the Helsinki declaration. It is obvious that the Shiptar secessionists, not only in Kosovo and Metodia, are relying on the forces which stand behind them, the most prominent of which are to be found in the Moslem states. The Islamic component was not particularly noticeable in the early stages of Shiptar secessionism because it did not accord with the encouragement coming from the "leading atheist state in the world", that is, Albania. This does not mean, however, that a majority of the leaders from the Moslem religious structures were not actively involved in the secessionist movement but only that they did not stand at its head and did not give it a religious designation. It was more important for the Shiptar secessionists to follow and bow to the current political trends, going along with and making use of those which offered the greatest opportunities. In the beginning this was the Albanian and state leadership so that, during the period of Dr. Sali Berisha's rule, support was found both in the Albanian state and in the international community, that is, in the western countries. However, since that side has shown more and more in recent times that the "problem of the Shiptars, that is Kosovo" should be resolved within the framework of Yugoslavia, Islamic tendencies have strengthened. After all, let us recall that Albania itself has joined the Community of Islamic states and, in addition to that, two other crucial factors are influencing the new Shiptar orientation. One of these factors is the Bosniak-Moslem movement of Alija Izetbegovic and the other is the Sandzak-Moslem movement of Sulejman Ugljanin. The basis of both these movements lies in Islam although modified, for very practical reasons, into a pseudo-secular version adapted to the needs of the present political climate prevailing in contemporary Western society. All of this has one, ultimate, aim, visible to the observer but undeclared. This aim, in principle, is not new and is clearly expressed in the well known view "everything which was once Islamic must be so again". However, in this specific instance, although within a relatively small area, in the south of Europe, it has a far-reaching significance. Namely, the south of Europe is the only place where there are regions in which Moslems have been living since medieval times. They are the descendants of converts from the ranks of the original inhabitants who accepted the Moslem faith and they are to be found in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia and Hercegovina (that is, the probable Bosnian-Croat federation) and Albania. The ties between them has created a transversal which connects them with Turkey and through that country with other Moslem countries in Asia and Africa as well. Furthermore, the potential has been created for the uniting of all of the south European Moslems because it should not be forgotten that Islam recognises no boundaries and that they accepted the present format modelled on other states as a result of the disunion within Islam map no.13. Map 13: Moslems in the Mediterranean and the Balkans It is interesting to note that, in all of the aforementioned region, the location of several Balkan states, the total number of Moslems does not surpass the number of Moslems who live, for example, in Germany and it is almost identical with the number of Moslems in France or with the number of Moslems in the United States. Whether that numerical coincidence points to some other possible future coincidences of another kind in those countries, we do not know. We believe that our grandchildren and great-grandchildren will more easily be able to answer that question. One can pose the very logical question in connection with the thesis that future conflicts will be conducted in the form of trade wars as to what significance and role Albania will have and who is the candidate that is engaged in conquering this still undefined "hill" but certainly not a firm redoubt for which, so it seems to us, circumstances do not hold out much promise. Albania is located in an insignificant and small area with unsatisfactory terrain and its only advantage is that it can serve as one of the two flanking watchtowers overlooking the entrance to the Adriatic. As far as the potential influence of the Albanians is concerned, it amounts to no more than a barely audible sound within a relatively compressed space, in fact, only so far as the Albanian national minorities reach in the neighbouring states, that is, in Yugoslavia, Macedonia and Greece. Their activities which, hitherto, have appeared in the greatest possible degree as negative, openly secessionist and destructive in all three countries without exception, reveal fairly clearly who is the source of the bad relations between neighbours and the potential instigator of crises and disagreements. The three major candidates, however, who are undoubtedly very interested in exercising their influence in Albania are the United States, Italy and both Islamic currents, the fundamentalist and the milder, nearer, secularist. From the historical point of view, Italy is the oldest of the occupiers of this region, from 146 BC to the Venetian Republic in the Middle Ages and once more as the ally of Fascist Germany during the Second World War of which something has already been said in the pages of this book. However, it is very difficult to say how far Italy would get involved today in such an adventure in the new, changed geopolitical and, as Edward Lutvik, director of strategic and international studies in Washington, calls it, geo-economic conditions. After all, during the secessions and wars which have engulfed the Balkans in the last decade of the twentieth century, Italian policy has clearly failed to find its way, is lacking in ideas and has no sense of direction. Not completely understandably although not unexpectedly (with regard to its recent rulers), Italy has neglected its possibilities, sullenly withdrawn into itself and followed the political lead of others in an area where, until recently, it played an active part. It seems, however, that Italy has recently started to move again although less so in the area of the former Yugoslavia and somewhat more in Albania with, for now, humanitarian aid and a little more investment in the Albanian economy. It is uncertain what the extent of Italian involvement in Albania will be. It seems that this does not only depend on Italy but it would surely be to the benefit of both sides. Italy has the necessary capital and Albania has oil, mineral wealth, the potential for livestock and so forth. Such a connection would offer Albania the opportunity for more serious development so essential to this, without belittlement or maliciousness, unfortunately most backward of all the European countries. Maybe internal economic prosperity would lead to a change in Albanian policy and, instead of demonstrating the constant desire for expansion towards its neighbours, it would be more realistic for Albania to devote itself to developing its own potential. Such a change in attitude would lower tensions in the Balkans where, let us not forget, they have too frequently passed the tolerance threshhold and become the motive for a fierce settling of accounts between the Balkan peoples. This especially appeared in a very passionate and violent form when the instigation for such action came from outside and the greater the influence and power of the outside sponsor, the greater were the effects. Now something in short about the other candidate. A firm and resistant form of secular Islam does not exist. Relatively modest grounds and motivations can in a very short time easily replace a secular government with a radical fundamentalist one and this would inevitable lead to the using of Albania as a place d'armes facing Europe. This is not the author of this book's hypothesis but is laid down in a published programme in which it is written: "The first and most important conclusion is certainly the conclusion concerning the incompatibility of Islam and non-Islamic systems. There is no peace or co-existence between the 'Islamic faith' and non-Islamic social and political institutions."33 It is clear from the foregoing that there is no room for doubt. There would be no peace! After all, at the time of the writing of this book (June 1994), war is still raging in the former republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina. As far as the United States is concerned: the strongest power in the world, freed from a "counterbalance", wants to be "present" at all the "potentially useful" points in the world. Everything that has been said in this chapter describes what kind of crossroads faces the peoples and minorities of the Balkans. Until now we have spoken mostly of the choice of road selected by one side and significantly less about the other which represents the state-constituting nations of Yugoslavia. The Serbs and Montenegrins find themselves, yet again, at the centre of a crisis in the Balkans. How and why is this so? Jovan Cvijic, the great Serbian scientist, geographer and anthropologist, has explained this simply and precisely: "We have built our house in the middle of the road and so we get in everyone's way! This witty statement really does sum up the essence of the attitude taken towards the Serbs. They are in a place where they hindered and got in the way of all those who wanted to roam about in this part of the world whether they were the great and powerful whose complex of greatness harried them into imprudent and incautious steps or the small and weak, pushed by impotence into unrealisable adventures. History has gifted modern Serbia (from Karadjordje's time, 1804) with much suffering, destruction, pressures and other misfortunes but never with subjugation. This fact, that a people resists subjugation and does not accept defeat, is surely not well received by those for whom "Serbia stands in their way" and so the reactions from that quarter are not surprising. One more factor is of importance when discussing the unavoidable causes which provoke the animosity shown, particularly by the great, towards Serbia. That people is, according to its characteristics, mentality and historical experience, very focused and so is predisposed to taking initiatives and playing a key role in many historical events, especially during the last two centuries. For example: starting the struggle for the national liberation of all the peoples in the Balkans, that is, the Serbian revolution of 1804; the decisive role played by Serbia during the First and Second Balkan wars; the successful struggle for the liberation of Serbia during the First World War and the beginning of the uprising against the Third Reich during the Second World War. All of these actions confirm that Serbia was an indispensable factor in resolving the many problems in the Balkans. It is both interesting and yet strange, however, that the Serbian question which has so often been raised in modern European history has even to the present day remained unresolved. Without any hesitation or deep analysis it can be said that a significant number of the Balkan peoples have resolved their problems at the expense of the Serbs. The Albanian national minority today is trying, once again, to do the same with the noticeable help of some other Balkan peoples according to the principle of taking advantage for oneself from the conflicts of others. However, one cannot deny the role of the actions of the Serbian people itself in the dividing of the Serbs, in the unenviable situation of the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia and the general situation in which Serbia has found itself in the last three to four years. Neither this time was the well known disharmony lacking. A similar negative effect can be ascribed to the Serbs' lack of resistance to the sly ploy of buying up their houses and land in Kosovo and Metohia for fabulous prices, far above their real value. They have sold their possessions for large amounts of foreign currency and abandoned Kosovo and Metohia. This method of buying up Serbian property has been just as effective as the expulsions achieved by threats, attacks and other forcible means. Momentary wealth has been acquired with a signature on a sales contract but also the uncertain status of an emigrant.34 The unusual but successfully organised sources of income which have enabled the Shiptar secessionist factors to make use of similarly unusual high finances have offered them the opportunity to buy significant privileges for "small change". The chaotic situation in the entire financial and economic system in the country, primarily as a consequence of the sanctions against Yugoslavia, has led to a situation where, at one time, the average monthly pay of those in work amounted to no more than two or three Deutschmarks. This situation brought about the easy buying-out of a good part of the Serbian bureaucratic class in Kosovo and Metohia and it went so far that, among other things, even school certificates were bought for money. The usual price for many other kinds of similar services was ten Deutschmarks and so this phenomenon, because of the large profits, is called in the Albanian language "tel marke". The concurrence of a series of unfortunate and unpleasant circumstances has led to sad and impermissible weaknesses which have had a tragic effect on the morale of both peoples in Kosovo and Metohia. The Serbs on the defensive, subject to temptation, restless and with no real confidence in the future and the Shiptar people, headed by an arrogant, nationalistic leadership which for the most part is sucked into a witches' brew of chauvinism, caught up in the illusion that, with the help of an external factor, it will be able to carry out a forcible secession exemplified in the widespread misuse of the guiding slogan "Kosovo - Republic" (read: "Kosovo - Albania"). Both peoples find themselves at a dangerous crossroads. To live alongside each other in such tension is not possible and both one and the other sense this. The Shiptars hoped that outside pressure, sanctions, hostile encirclement and suchlike would break Serbia and that others would enable them to realise their aim. The Serbs have relied on their firmness and the hope that the experience gained in their age-old struggles for survival would prevail this time as well. Both sides have understood that the path from the crossroads can lead only in one direction. The Serbian government offered a democratic state and full civic rights to every citizen of Yugoslavia. The Shiptar leadership knew that if it accepted that, the passion and craving for secession would dry up. What then? Let us return once again to the already mentioned functionary for whom a political resurrection has been arranged so that he might proclaim what ought to be done. He stated both the basis and the ways and means for what "ought to follow". Here is what he found as the basis: "From ancient times until today Kosovo has had its political identity, borders, autonomy and varying degrees of independence." Without the need to refute every one, literally, every one of the attributes connected to "Kosovo from ancient times", let us mention, apart from the already proffered maps of Ptolemy, Peutingeriana map and those of Waldzeemuller, Ortelius, Vavasori, De Wal, Cornelius and many others. We shall also draw attention to one more detail for which we are indebted to the historian and publicist, Mihailo Stanisic, who writes that the present names Kosovo, Metohia and Kosmet are not only a falsification of history but also a deception with far-reaching consequences. Both in history and geography Kosovo represents only one of ten districts known for centuries as Old Serbia (he also says more precisely that Old Serbia consists of nine districts, leaving out Ras alias Sandzak )35 which, as ancient, natural, topographic- orthographic and toponymic entities, the invaders of Serbian lands fused into the single name, Kosovo, in order to make it easier to exterminate the cradle of Serbdom and the inheritance and foundations of the Serbs' state and history. These are the districts: Gornja (Binicka) Morava, Kosovo, Lab, Gornji Ibar (Ibarski Kolasin), Drenica, Hvosno-Metohia, Prizrensko polje with Gora and Has, Sredacka and Sirinska Zupa. (see Map1) After listing these facts, there is really no need to add anything at all to the thesis about "Kosovo from ancient times..." but, in conclusion, it is necessary to cite the solution offered by that, may we be forgiven but we have to say, resurrected politician: "If the United States and Europe continue to hold the view that Kosovo should stay under the control of Serbia, a great injustice will be done to the Albanian people (??) which it will never accept. The unresolved Albanian question in the Balkans (?!) will become a time-bomb and the Albanians will be forced to engage in a war (!!!) for their liberation. But, that war will take on wider dimensions..."
  5. Vladika raško-prizrenski Artemije, nagradio sto srpskih porodilja i majki sa èetvoro i više dece u manastiru Graèanica Orden majkama Jugoviæa Na Vidovdan srpske majke sa èetvoro i više dece dobile su zlatni ili srebrni Orden majke Jugoviæa, a sto novoroðenèadi po sto evra Vladika raško-prizrenski Artemije, na Vidovdan odlikovao je srpske majke sa èetvoro i više dece zlatnim i srebrnim Ordenom majke Jugoviæa. Orden je dobilo sto kosovskih porodilja, a svako novoroðeno dete nagraðeno je sa po sto evra iz fonda za Kosovo pri vladi Srbije. Ovih stotinu majki s Kosova rodilo je ukupno 500 dece, a njih sedam ima po šestoro dece. Meðu nagraðenima su se našle Slavica Sojeviæ, Zorica Steviæ, Milka Grbiæ i Kosara Krstiuæ, Gordana Stankoviæ, sve iz Donje Gušterice, Radmila Stojiljkoviæ, Stanka Ðorðeviæ i Božana Ðedojeviæ iz Stanišara. Slaðana Stankoviæ iz Tomanca, Jadranka Lazareviæ iz Laposaviæa i Velimirka Peroviæ iz Leposaviæa, imaju po šestoro dece. - Raðamo jer okružene mališanima lakše preživljavamo ove teške i smutne dane i svoje kosovske muke - rekle su majke vladiki Artemiju i poruèile srpskoj javnosti da se Kosovo ne brani reèima nego raðanjem potomaka, jer je to jedan od naèina da se održimo. Na Vidovdansku proslavu došlo je oko pet stotina Srba, a u mestu Graèanici živi oko sedam hiljada duša - rekla nam je uèiteljica Danica Krstiæ. Uèiteljica Milanka Markoviæ iz Gornje Brnice ne sme da nam kaže koliko ðaka uèi u njenoj školi. - Može neko taj podatak da zloupotrebi - kategorièna je. I manastir i selo obezbeðuju snage Kfora iz Švedske. Uveèe je u jednom od restorana koncert održao folk pevaè Ðani. Cena ulaznice dve stotine dinara. U dvorištima kolju se prasiæi za sveèanu trpezu. Mihajlo Despot prodaje ikone i suvenire ispred manastirskog zdanja koje je u 14. veku podigao kralj Milutin. - Najviše se kupuju ikone sv. Nikole, sv. Stefana i sv. Ðorða - veli snishljdovo Mihajlo. Kaširamo ih pod presom. U manastirskom zdanju se nalazi kivot sa moštima Svetog Stefana. Narod prilazi, celiva mošti. Drugi pale sveæe. Zdanje deluje umirujuæe na hodoèasnike. Nepoverljiv je Mihajlo, kao i veæina preostalih Srba jer, kako kažu, dogaða se da Albanci namerno i osiono jure kolima kroz Graèanicu. Igumanija Jevrosinija, upravitelj manastira, takoðe je nepoverljiva prema došljacima. Ali, monahinja Teodora, saznajemo, pravi je majstor za hvatanje pèelinjih rojeva na imanju manastira Graèanica. U poslednjih trideset pet godina ona je pronašla i smestila u manastirske košnice 70 rojeva. U poslu joj, s vremena na vreme, pomaže i Milan Markoviæ iz Graèanice. Manastirski pèelinjak broji pedesetak košnica odakle se godišnje, za potrebe sestrinstva, izvrca oko hiljadu kilograma kvalitetnog meda. - Evo, pogledajte, pèele su se urojile na stablu breskve, na visini od jedva metar i po. Dok ne uðu u traku - vršèaru treba s njima imati veliko strpeljenje. Zasejale smo na svom imanju i faceliju, najmedonosniju biljku - veli monahinja Teodora.
  6. Uticaj carice Jelene NA severnim granicama Srbije zavladao je mir, uz gubljenje Kuèeva i Branièeva, èiji su se gospodari Rastislaliæi potpuno priklonili Maðarima, ne priznajuæi Urošu centralnu vlst, kao i Maèva koju su Maðari zaposeli. Carica Jelena je vladala u serskoj oblasti deset godina (sve do 1356. godine), uz pomoæ srpskih i grèkih vlastelina i savetnika. Ona se najviše oslanjala na Uglješu (Jovana) Mrnjavèeviæa, mlaðeg brata Vukašina Mrnjavèeviæa, koji je postao njen savladar, a kasnije, kada je Vukašin proglašen za kralja, dobio i titulu despota. Prema Jovanu Kantakuzenu, koji se posle smenjivanja sa carske funkcije studioznije bavio istorijom, carica Jelena posle Dušanove smrti u nastalom metežu "nije imala poverenja, podjednako ni prema sinu ni prema deveru Simeunu, veæ je sebi potèinila mnoge gradove, okružila se nemalom silom i poèela da vlada sama za sebe, pa niti je protiv koga ratovala, niti kome pomagala u ratu". Naš istaknuti istorièar Stojan Novakoviæ je pretpostavio da se carica Jelena u momentu Dušanove smrti zatekla u Seru i tako je "u tom kraju ostala s vrhovnom carskom vlašæu", verovatno uz pristanak mladog cara Uroša, koji je svoju vlast u Seru "svojoj majci ustupio". Sve ovo je neizvesno i istorijski se nije moglo potvrditi, ali je carica Jelena ostala u dobrim odnosima sa svojim sinom Urošem skoro za sve vreme svoje vladavine u Seru i priznavala njegovu vrhovnu vlast, kao što je to uèinio i Uglješa Mrnjavèeviæ, mada je to priznavanje bilo više formalne prirode. CAR Uroš je majci i Uglješi vojno pomagao. Tako im je poslao pomoæ u suzbijanju Vizantinaca i turskih najamnika na sersku oblast koje je predvodio Matija Kantakuzen 1357. godine. Carica Jelena se uskoro, posle Dušanove smrti, zamonašila i u Uroševoj povelji od maja 1356. godine ona se pominje pod monaškim imenom Jelisaveta. Meðutim, to joj nije smetalo da vlada u Seru, a njenim podanicima da je smatraju svojom vladarkom. Ona je svakako umela da se prilagodi grèkoj sredini u Seru. Spomenici vezani za njenu liènost, govore o njenim vizantijskim naklonostima i ambicijama. Jelena je bila obrazovana i inteligentna žena, živog politièkog temperamenta. Poznato je da je veæ na Dušanovom dvoru zauzimala vrlo vidno mesto i da je aktivno uèestvovala u politièkim pregovorima i odlukama. Njene politièke ambicije krunisane su preuzimanjem vlasti i dugogodišnjom vladavinom u serskoj oblasti. Saèuvani dokumenti govore o tome da ona Seru nije samo formalno vladala, veæ je i izdavala nareðenja, donosila odluke... U podruèju oko Konavlja, pa sve do Podrinja, s Trebinjem, Gackim i Plimljem vladao je srodnik i prijatelj cara Uroša knez Vojislav Vojinoviæ, koji je napustio službu u dvoru cara Uroša, do kraja mu ostao veran i ukazivao mu punu podršku. Na podruèju Zete, odmah posle Simeuna odmetnuli su se i zetski gospodari Balšiæi, što je bio sluèaj i s bratom carice Jelene, despotom Jovanom Komninom Asenom, namesnikom oblasti Kanine. Uz cara Uroša brzo izbija na površinu Vukašin Mrnjavèeviæ. Poreklo porodice Mrnjavèeviæ nije pouzdano utvrðeno, ali se smatra da su Vukašin i Gojko, sinovi siromašnog vlastelina Mrnjave iz Livna u Humu, koje je car Dušan posle izvesnih njihovih zasluga za carevinu postavljao na odgovorne položaje u tzv. grèkim oblastima, želeæi da tamo ima pouzdanu srpsku vlastelu. Braæa Mnjavèeviæ se prvi put pominju 1332. godine, kada su se istakli u odbrani Skadra u toku pobune u Zeti protiv tada kralja Dušana, da bi ih, zatim, car Dušan preuzeo na svoj dvor, postavio na visoke položaje i na kraju razmestio na odgovarajuæe položaje u grèkim oblastima. Vukašin se od 1350. godine pominje kao župan prilepskog kraja, gde je uèvrstio svoju porodiènu vlast, a njegov najstariji sin Marko od 1361. godine kao poslanik cara Uroša u Dubrovniku za vreme njihovih ratova s knezom Vojislavom Vojinoviæem. JAKE LIÈNOSTI VUKAŠIN se posle Uroševog proglašenja za cara, istome potpuno priklonio i èesto boravio na njegovom dvoru. On ubrzo postaje veoma moæna i ugledna liènost na dvoru cara Uroša, pa su, pored ostalog, Dubrovèani smatrali za potrebno da pored caru Urošu, pišu i njemu, kada im je bilo potrebno da obave neki posao sa Srbijom. Na ovo je svakako uticala i okolnost što je u meðuvremenu car Uroš ostao bez nekih svojih najuglednijih vojvoda, Preljuba i Olivera, pa mu je trebao oslonac u nekoj jakoj liènosti. (Nastavlja se)
  7. Патријарх српски Павле, уз саслужење владика рашко-призренског и косовско-метохијског Артемија и Теодосија и умировљеног епископа захумско-херцеговачког Атанасија, служио је јутарњу свечану видовданску литургију у манастиру Грачаница. Осим неколико стотина верника, литургији су присуствовали и шеф дипломатије Србије и Црне Горе Вук Драшковић, републички министар за културу Драган Којадиновић и учесници песничке манифестације „Видовданско песничко причешће”. Патријарх Павле данас ће служити и помен косовским јунацима на Газиместану. Из Грачанице до Газиместана кренуло је неколико стотина Срба који су без проблема стигли на Газиместан. Спомен-обележје косовским јунацима на Газиместану обезбеђују војници КФОР-а, а на путу од Грачанице ка Газиместану распоређене су и појачане патроле косовске полиције. Одржан парастос киднапованим па убијеним на Косову Парастос особама које су киднаповане па убијене на Косову и Метохији одржан је данас у Саборној цркви у Београду. Парастос је служио старешина те цркве Петар Лукић уз саслужење свештенства Саборне цркве. „Вечна нек је слава свима онима који животе изгубише на Косову и Метохији од Косовске битке па све до данас. Покој души свима онима који животе изгубише у монструозном егзодусу”, рекао је Лукић. „Где су Срби? Отиђите у београдске цркве и видите колико је Срба на Видовдан у цркву дошло”,pekао је старешина Саборне цркве и додао: „То ћемо платити, и сада плаћамо”. Лукић је критиковао и, како је рекао, „невладине, такозване хуманитарне, организације” оптуживши их да сносе део кривице за све што се дешава Србима. Парастос, ком је присуствовало око 100 људи, одржан је за 132 особе са Косова и Метохије чија су тела пронађена, предата породицама и сахрањена. Удружење породица киднапованих и несталих лица на Косову и Метохији још трага за неколико стотина чланова породица који су отети у периоду од 1998. до 2002. године. (Бета)
  8. Bratska borba TAKO se Simeun ubrzo posle Dušanove smrti (1356.) sam proglasio za cara i uz pomoæ svog tasta, despota Jovana Komnina iz Valone, nastojao da ovo i ostvari. Sa vojskom od oko 5.000 ljudi krenuo je iz Kostura prema severu, tražeæi od vlastele preko èije je teritorije prelazio, da ga priznaju za cara. Meðutim, najveæi broj vlastele u ovim krajevima ostao je uz Uroša, jer je on bio stvarni naslednik svoga oca, a, to je bilo i neposredno posle Dušanove smrti, kada je još uvek delovao autoritet njegovog reda i poretka. Sa druge strane, Simeun i nije bio popularan kod srpske vlastele. Po majci i vaspitanju smatran je polu-Grkom. Usled ovoga došlo je do borbe izmeðu Simeona i njegovih najbližih suseda Hlapena, gospodara Vodena i Bera, i Branka Mladenoviæa, gospodara ohridskog kraja. U borbama koje su voðene u leto 1356. godine postradaše mnogi krajevi i gradovi, meðu kojima naroèito grad Ber. Videvši Uroševu slabost i meðusobne borbe despota Simeuna i srpskih feudalaca, a koristeæi okolnost što je u meðuvremenu umro pozanti Dušanov vojskovoða i namesnik Tesalije Preljub, na južne pokrajine srpske carevine krenuše i Vizantinci. Tako potomak starih epirskih gospodara Niæifor Drugi sakupi dosta vojske i brodova i njima doplovi do Tesalije. Nju osvoji prognavši odatle Preljubovu ženu i srpske velikaše. Zatim krenu na Epir i osvoji ga koristeæi Simeunovu zauzetost na severu. Potisnut na severu i uplašen Niæiforovim akcijama, Simeun pokuša da se nagodi s Urošem uz posredstvo Dubrovaèke Republike, koja je dobro stajala sa Urošem. Tražio je od Uroša bar udeoništvo u carevanju. Na saboru u Skoplju, u aprilu 1357. godine, Uroš je podržan od vlastele i sveštenstva i proglašen za cara, a osuðeni postupci Dušanovog poubrata Simeuna. Simeunu sada nije ostalo ništa drugo veæ da pokuša da povrati izgubljene oblasti. Uz pomoæ pobunjenih albanskih plemena, posle bitke kod Aheloja, 1358. godine, u kojoj je Niæifor poginuo, a njegova vojska poražena, uspeo je da povrati svoje ranije oblasti u Epiru, kao i da proširi svoju vlast nad Tesalijom. POÈETKOM 1359. godine Simeun je pokušao da proširi svoje oblasti prema Skadru, ali pošto je tamo naišao na veliki otpor, na kraju se smirio. Zadovoljio se time da vlada na glavnom delu tzv. grèkih oblasti srpske države, sa sedištem u Trikali. U svojoj prestonici živeo je potpuno u grèkom krugu, kao kakav grèki dinast, posvetivši se gotovo iskljuèivo svojim podanicima grèkog porekla. U njegovim poveljama iz toga vremena grèka imena se pišu ispred srpskih. On se potpisuje samo grèki i kao grèki princ istièe svoje poreklo od Paleologa, a ne od Nemanjiæa. Ovim Simeunovim postupcima i akcijama, kojima je praktièno prekinuo sve veze sa srpskom državom, njegove pokrajine Epir i Tesalija bile su potpuno otpisane za Srbiju. Videvši sve to i svesna da Uroš nije dorastao državnoj moæi svoga oca, njegova majka, carica Jelena, uzima i sama da vlada drugim delom tzv. grèkih oblasti oko Sera (Sereza) i Drame, sa sedištem u Seru, dobivši za ovo punu podršku tamošnje srpske i vizantijske vlastele. Njihovim primerom krenula je još smelije srpska vlastela. Najmoæniji od njih potisnuše niže i slabije i, koliko su to mogli, prigrabiše od njih sela i gradove. Srpska vlastela, verna caru, smatrala se gospodarom svoga podruèja i nazivala sebe "carskim prijateljima i saveznicima". U atmosferi pocepanosti i nesigurnosti oslabila je otporna snaga zemlje. Oblasni gospodari ponašali su se kao mali vladari. Kao takvi kovali su i svoj novac, naplaæivali carine i druge prihode i lišavali cara njegovih prihoda i prava. Ovakvo stanje u zemlji uticalo je i na privredu, èiji je uspon osetno zastao. POVLAÈENjE MAÐARA NA ovako oslabljenu Srbiju sa severa su krenuli Maðari. Njihov kralj Ludovik Prvi, pošto je prethodno pribavio vazalstvo vlastelina Rastislaliæa u Branièevu i Kuèevu, krenuo je 1359. godine s velikom vojskom na Srbiju i duboko prodro u Šumadiju. Uroš mu je krenuo u susret s znatno manjom vojskom, jer veæu nije mogao da prikupi. Nedovoljno vešt u njenom voðenju pretrpeo je poraz na otvorenom polju. Kreæuæi se dalje kroz šumovite predele Rudnika, maðarska vojska je nailazila na sve veæi otpor. Ostaviši bez hrane koju je narod sklanjao u šume i zabita mesta zajedno sa stokom i posle velikih gubitaka u sukobu kod Ostrvice, morala je da obustavi dalje napredovanje i povuèe se. (NASTAVLjA SE)
  9. СУТРА ЈЕ ВИДОВДАН – ПРАЗНИК СВЕТОГ ВЕЛИКОМУЧЕНИКА ЦАРА ЛАЗАРА И СВИХ СВЕТИХ МУЧЕНИКА СРПСКИХ Свети Великомученик цар Лазар се родио 1329. године у Прилепу. Још као дете био је благе нарави, оштроуман и добродушан. Васпитаван је у хришћанској вери и побожности, и као такав од Бога доби многе дарове, које умножи, те тако даровит би узет на двор цара Душана, где постаде славан и уважаван од свих због своје честитости, витештва и побожности. Ожени се царевом рођаком, Милицом, кћерком кнеза Вратка. Године 1353. дато му је достојанство кнеза. У току свог живота обновио је манастир Хиландар и Горњак, подигао манастир Раваницу и Лазарицу и многе друге цркве и манастире. У Косовском боју, 15/28 јуна 1389. године, српска војска се борила против Турака, и том приликом кнез Лазар је пострадао. Тело му је пренето и сахрањено у његовој задужбини, манастиру Раваници, а затим пренето у сремску Раваницу, одакле је 1942. године пренето уСаборну цркву у Београду. Сада се његове Свете и чудотворне мошти налазе у манастиру Раваница код Ћуприје.
  10. http://www.svetosavlje.org
  11. ПОЧЕТАК ПЕТРОВСКОГ ПОСТА Данас почиње један од четири велика поста – Апостолски или Петровски пост, који ће трајати наредних петнаест дана, све до Петровдана (12. јул 2005. године), дана када се прослављају Свети апостоли Петра и Павле. =============================================== Braco i Sestre, nek' vam je svima Srecan pocetak posta, i nadam se da ce(mo) te svi postiti.
  12. САОПШТЕЊЕ ЗА ЈАВНОСТ МИТРОПОЛИЈЕ ЦРНОГОРСКО-ПРИМОРСКЕ ПОВОДОМ НАЈНОВИЈЕГ ВЕРБАЛНОГ НАПАДА НА ЦРКВУ ХРИСТОВУ У ЦРНОЈ ГОРИ На Скупштини Црне Горе, у сриједу 23. јуна 2005. године, Албанац, посланик муслиман Мехмед Бардхи, назвао је цркву Свете Тројице, постављену за Тројчиндан на Румији - гвожђуријом, запријетивши ако је држава не уклони да ће они (ко су ти они?) "тражити начин да се бране". Остварење десетовјековног хришћанског предања везаног за некадашњи храм на Румији постављањем новог на његово мјесто, исти је назвао "провокацијом", а за оне који ће се молити у обновљеном храму не зна дали су "лисице или вукови". Нажалост, ово није први пут да Бардхи директно напада и блати Православну Цркву у Црној Гори. Њему смета и тамјан на древном хришћанском светилишту Пречисте Крајинске. Својим фанатичним изјавама он дуже времена блати Цркву, користећи свој положај уносећи злу крв и мржњу међу честите житеље Шестана, Мурића, Владимира, Крајине и шире, без обзира на њихову вјерску и националну припадност. Нарочито се окомио на Митрополију црногорско-приморску и њеног Митрополита који се од свог доласка за Митрополита Црногорског труди да његује братске односе са муслиманима Црне Горе о чему позива за свједоке бившег честитог Реиса г. Демировића и садашњег г.Фејзића као и многе друге муслимане (његово спречавање паљења џамије у Београду, познато је читавом свијету). Г. Бардхи припада часном албанском народу који је некада био сав хришћански а данас најмање 40% у Албанији исповиједа хришћанску вјеру (30% православаца, 10% римокатолика) па се питамо: Да ли г. Бардхију као муслиману смета само тамјан у Пречистој Крајинској и храм посвећен Богу Љубави на Румији или и сви хришћански храмови у његовој матичној земљи? Једно је очевидно: уколико храм Свете Тројице на Румији, којим је остварено вјековно завјештање предака, не сруше прозвани државни органи да би њега и њему сличне, за које је храм Божји на Румији "гвожђурија" и "скаламерија", задовољили, онда ће то учинити он. Јер шта би друго значила његова пријетња да ће "ствари кренути другим током" него позив на јуриш на румијску црквицу? Може то г. Бардхи или други црквенорушитељи у Црној Гори да учини. Једно нека знаде уважени господин посланик као и други рушитељи овог завјетног храма: Срушена црквица Свете Тројице на Румији биће 151. у низу срушених храмова од албанских терориста на Косову и Метохији од 1999. године - до марта 2004. године. Овоме смо дужни да додамо и следећу Божју истину: Рушење ове црквице значило би презрење Божје и братске љубави која њоме грли исток и запад, сјевер и југ; Значило би и пљување по Часном Крсту Св.Јована Владимира око кога се последњих вјекова на Румији окупљају православни, римокатолици и муслимани. А шта би то било друго ако не једно од нових безумља и несрећа за Црну Гору и све њене житеље! Извор: Светигора прес
  13. Hrebeljanoviæi na dvoru PIŠE: dr Miladin Stevanoviæ RODONAÈELNIK Hrebeljanoviæa (otac Lazarevog oca Pripca) nije poznat. Pouzdano se samo zna da se baština Hrebeljanoviæa nalazila na Kosovu kod Novog Brda, sa sedištem u Prilepcu. U ovom selu se u srednjem veku nalazila omanja tvrðava, koja je zajedno sa drugom sliènom tvrðavom Prizrencem u blizini štitila mnogobrojne rudokope u tome kraju. Otac kneza Lazara Pribac Hrebeljanoviæ je bio vlastelin i velikaš za vreme vladavine cara Dušana, kog je on sa svojom porodicom doveo u svoj dvor i postavio za logoteta (šefa dvorske kancelarije), a kasnije i za svoga peharnika. Carski logotet nije zauzimao neko visoko mesto na srpskom ni vizantijskom dvoru, ali je bio veoma uticajna liènost i po èlanu 25 Dušanovog zakonika bio jedina liènost u državi koja je uz cara i patrijarha imala pravo da upravlja crkvom. Ne zna se taèno kada je car Dušan doveo Pripca na dvor i od kada je bio logotet. Prvi pisani dokument iz kojeg se vidi da se on nalazi na ovoj dužnosti potièe iz 1340. godine(jedna povelja cara Dušana na kojoj se on potpisao kao logotet Pribac). Pribac Hrebeljanoviæ je morao biti dobro pismen, istaknutiji i sa diplomatskim sklonostima službenik jer su na vizantijskim dvorovima, na koje se car Dušan ugledao, ove položaje zauzimali takvi ljudi. SAÈUVANI su brojni dokumenti iz kojih se vidi da se Pribac dugo zadržao na ovom položaju, saèinio niz povelja i drugih dokumenata po nalogu cara Dušana. U zvanju peharnika, koje je znaèilo izvesno unapreðenje u dvorskoj službi cara Dušana, Pribac se pojavljuje u jednom saèuvanom dokumentu u svetogorskom manastiru Lavri. Ne može se pouzdano utvrditi dokle je Pribac ostao u carskoj službi i dokle je živeo, ali, po svim izgledima, on nije imao neku veæu baštinu i spadao je u red nepoznate vlastele, a car Dušan ga je uzdigao svakako zbog njegovog znanja i verne službe. Imao je sina Lazara, æerku Draginju i još jednu æerku èije se ime ne zna. Knez Lazar je roðen u Prilepcu, 1329. godine, a ništa se ne zna o njegovoj majci. Kao dete odveden je u carski dvor gde je odrastao i vaspitao se. Na carskom dvoru se 1353. godine oženio Milicom, æerkom kneza Vlatka, potomka Nemanjinog sina Vukana, koja je takoðe odrasla i vaspitala se na carskom dvoru. Ovim se Lazar orodio sa svetorodnom dinastijom Nemanjiæa. Knez Lazar je zapoèeo i završio dvorsku karijeru kod cara Dušana kao stavilac. Na istoj dužnosti se u carskom dvoru tada nalazio i Vojislav Vojinoviæ, kasnije jedan od najmoænijih oblasnih gospodara u doba raspada Dušanovog carstva, koji je podržavao cara Uroša. S Milicom Lazar je imao osmoro dece: Maru, Stefana, Draganu, Vuka, Jelu, Teodoru, Dobrivoja i Oliveru. Sva ova deca su odrasla na carskim dvorovima careva Dušana i Uroša, gde im je i otac službovao. Pre 1371. godine (više od èetiri decenije života) o Lazaru Hrebeljanoviæu, sem njegovog porekla, ženidbi i prvom službovanju, se gotovo ništa ne zna. Tek od tada, u doba vladavine cara Uroša, kod kojeg je nastavio da radi kao i kod njegovog oca cara Dušana na dužnosti stavioca, o njemu se nešto više saznaje i javljaju se dokumenti u kojima se pominje i njegovo ime. POSLEsmrti cara Dušana njegova država, etnièki veoma raznolika, s moænim feudalnim gospodarima, meðu kojima je bilo dosta Grka koji su težili da se osamostale od centralne vlasti i za sebe prigrabe što više teritorija, poèela je ubrzo da se raspada na feudalne oblasti. Dušanov naslednik, mladi kralj Uroš, sa devetnaest godina, iako je za oèeva života upravljao delom carevine (tzv. srpskim zemljama), bio je nedorastao za ogromno nasledstvo, a i kasnije kada je stasao, u veoma složenoj situaciji u državi, nije se snalazio, odnosno, nije pokazivo poznate oèeve crte. Nije bio dobar vojnik, ni vojskovoða kao njegov otac, ni mudar državnik, ni vešt taktièar. Kao takvom, iako je ulagao dosta napora i pokazao neke rezultate, narodno predanje mu je dalo naziv Nejaki Uroš. SLABOST POSLE DUŠANA ZBOG svega ovoga, Uroš nije uspeo da se odupre spoljnim neprijateljima, ni da drži u stezi feudalne gospodare, meðu kojima su se isticali Mrnjavèeviæi, Rastislaliæi, Balšiæi, Dejanoviæi i drugi, koji su samo formalno, ili nisu nikako priznavali njegovu centralnu vlast. Protiv Uroša je meðu prvima ustao njegov stric, Dušanov polubrat, despot i epirski namesnik Simeun-Siniša, koji je pretendovao da nasledi cara Dušana, pozivao se na to da ga je car Dušan kao brata svojevremeno naznaèio za naslednika. Upravo Simeon je najviše doprineo raspadu Dušanovog carstva ozbiljno poremetivši odnose i red u državi. Na njega su se kasnije ugledali i drugi. (NASTAVLjA SE)
  14. April Days, 1987 Two declarations which we would like to mention contain the essence of the Shiptars' efforts and aims, that is, the essence of their aspirations which have stretched through three Leagues of Prizren 26, the kacak uprisings and rebellions to the oath sworn in 1936 at the graveside of the "Albanian patriot", Bajo Topulija, in Djirokaster by the young Albanian intellectual and future master of Albania, Enver Hoxha, and which he himself published: "There will be a struggle for.... the true unification of the nation!" 27 The second arises from the time of the Second World War when the Albanian masses supported the slogan of Fascist Italy for the "expansion of Albania", from the so-called counter-revolution of 1981 in Kosovo and Metohia which manifested itself in demonstrations and armed attacks to the statement of the present president of Albania, Dr. Sali Berisha, published on May 6th 1994: "at the end of the day, the international community must take concrete measures because sanctions, threats and ultimata are not enough. Encouraged by the hesitancy shown by the world, Serbia now can only understand the language of force, the sound of gunfire. It is still not too late for military intervention .." Our understanding and answer is that here it is a question of the political marketing, ideology, nationalism, pretensions and vanity of the "great" leaders of the people but it is also above all an attempt to transform the developed, cultivated, resource-rich and agriculturally and industrially strong Kosovo and Metohia into an economic reservation for the uncultivated, desolate and poverty-stricken Albania. The assumption of the Shiptar leaders from Kosovo and Metohia that, thanks to their pre-eminent position (the wealth of individual members of the Shiptar community in Yugoslavia, open lines of communication with all of the more important political world centres, established political connections with many states and diplomats) in relation to their motherland, the selfisolated Albania, they will have political predominance and be able to transfer the centre of their planned Great Albania to Kosovo and Metohia is illusory to an absurd degree. First of all this is because Albania would never agree to it and such a construction whereby Kosovo and Metohia would be separated from Yugoslavia but would have Albania "at its back" would be economically disastrous for both, that is, for Albania and for Kosovo and Metohia. The variant, however, whereby Kosovo and Metohia would be attached to the Albanian political authorities, that is, to Albania, would be until the exhaustion of Kosovo and Metohia, a real boon for Albania but such a combination would be of short duration and so, on the basis of all that has been said, the following question sounds completely logical: Would it have not been incomparably more natural for both the citizens of Albanian nationality and the Albanian state authorities to have opened up and to have concentrated on developing the economic, cultural, educational and other means and characteristics of their people instead of fuelling the misguided notion that all the economic woe and backwardness of that people would be resolved by the attachment of Kosovo and Metohia. It has to be realised, however, that this way of thinking was not exclusively that of Albanian leaders. They were directed to it through the centuries by the conquerors of their country - the Turks, the Italians, the Austrians - clearly completely in accordance with the typical attitude of all enslavers which can be comprised in the following sentence - let us buy your obedience and submission to our rule and in exchange we offer you your illusory right to usurp from others the fruits of their labours and to use the right to take possession of their land. This happened in its most blatant form during the Second World War when the enslaved Albanians from Albania and Shiptars from Yugoslavia "forded it" over Kosovo and Metohia while, in fact, working for the occupiers of both their own and of the Serbian people. It is also necessary to add the following comment for the truth about Albanian aspirations for the lands of others: history has confirmed of old the once upon a time quiet but also the "not so quiet" infiltration and penetration of Albanian families, groups and clans from the Albanian homeland into the Kosovo Greek Epirus and Metohia regions. These influxes were inspired by the wish for the usurpation and use of fertile pastures, cultivated fields and meadows. In normal circumstances, such movements in the search for pastures within the bounds of a state does not represent anything unusual, anything out of the ordinary. However, when this is continually carried out not for reasons, shall we say, of a pastoral nature but with political, aggressive intentions with no respect for established borders then it is not surprising that one can expect that the wronged party will react and prevent, sometimes after the event, these kinds of assaults. Nevertheless, this was never done in the case of the Albanian intrusions. Namely, in the state which "belonged to one man (and so it was even called Tito's Yugoslavia) not one of the series of different mass influxes of Albanian people into the territories of Yugoslavia was ever subjected to customary state measures, either administrative or of any other kind. On the other hand, to their astonishment and impotent anger, the Serbian "colonists", driven out of Kosovo and Metohia by the Fascist terror during the Second World War, were forbidden by a government decree of 1945 to return to the Kosovo and Metohia region. At the same time, that same government, making no objection of any kind, tolerated the settlement and continued residence in that region of all those citizens of neighbouring Albania who, under the aegis of the Italian and German occupation authorities, took advantage of the latter's benignity and encouragement and settled on Yugoslav soil. It is wholly comprehensible that this kind of position corresponds with the aspiration of the Albanian leadership to take over this region so that this old homogeneous Serbia region would gradually be completely transformed into a heterogeneous area by means of increased Albanian settlement and their rapid birthrate and later, applying other methods, once more into a homogeneous area but this time formed of the Albanian national minority. If we have offered an answer to the first question, and we hope that we have, then it remains for us to add this conclusion: the first "pastoral usurpations" of Serbian lands also had as their basis the aim of taking control of economic resources. At this point I would like to point out that the source of this kind of attitude should be sought in the influence which the Code of Laws of Leka Dukadjin had on that people. That law code laid down then (in the Middle Ages) that it was necessary to bow before those more powerful but to take from those who were weaker! The psychological effect of this message has permeated the consciousness of the Albanian people to the present day. The second question which requires an answer relates to the problem of the attitude of the authorities and people in Kosovo and Metohia and, of course, in Yugoslavia towards the events in that region. Put simply, what has been the attitude, primarily of the Serbs, to the Kosovo and Metohia syndrome? Without any exaggeration, we are convinced that that relationship is the essence both of the entire problem and of its resolution. It is not customary for conclusions to be cited at the beginning of the exposition of a problem under consideration but this time, however, we are forced to do so because many circumstances impel us. Simply put, the chauvinistically-minded Shiptars have operated in a compact, concentrated and like-minded manner whereas, in contrast to them, a veil of confusion has hovered around the Serbian population, preventing them from finding direction. This situation is, without a doubt, the product of the general attitude towards Serbia, that is, of the state organisation which arose after the Second World War by which Serbia was split into three - so-called Serbia proper, Vojvodina and Kosovo and Metohia. This situation was tacitly accepted, the government had so decided and in some state bodies this was even formally adopted and it was clear to everyone that decisions which had come through Party committees would not change. This bothered the masses but confirmed government functionaries in the conviction that no-one would be able to change the direction of the actions which they had chosen and the measures they carried out. This does not mean, however, that all of their decisions were passed without a word of criticism or protest but, at that time, this was reduced to individual acts or, in the most optimal circumstances, to the actions of small groups of like-minded people. One of the first people in the postwar life of this state to oppose a decision connected to the Serbian problem in Kosovo and Metohia was Sreten Vukosavljevic, a sociology professor and national deputy directly after the First World War who, after the Second World War, was minister for agrarian reform and colonisation in Tito's first government. He energetically opposed the famous law on the revision of the distribution of land to colonists proposed at the session of the Presidency of AVNOJ held on August 3rd 1945 declaring that the proposal for this law had not come from his ministry although his ministry was responsible for such matters. On that occasion he gave the prescient warning "... I am not in favour of making new mistakes, perhaps more serious ones, under the guise of correcting old ones!" Today, one can only mention with sadness the words of that man who saw much further than many others who did not want to hear and so who had learnt very well how to "listen". It is a well known and proven fact that exceptions prove the rule and so it was also in this case. Standing alongside Sreten Vukosavljevic was Marko Vujacic, vice-president of AVNOJ, who attempted to explain that the colonists were not some kind of"gendamerie of the old regime" which was one of the "arguments" used to "explain" the policy but that "... the greater part of the colonists in Kosovo and Metohia and Macedonia were peasants from Serbia and Montenegro who had left their hills and rocky plains and set off, hungry for land, searching for better conditions searching for better soil." 28 The outcome, alas, is well known. The law was passed. There was no place in Kosovo and Metohia for the Serbian colonists who had been settled there by the prewar Yugoslavia. There was even too much space for the Albanians settled there by the Italian occupation authorities but the indicator on the statistical scale moved clearly and to a large degree towards one side! Also heard was the voice of the academic, Vasa Cubrilovic, historian and politician, a member of the "Young Bosnia" organisation which carried out the assassination of the Grand Duke Ferdinand in 1914, who warned in a report to the Serbian Cultural Club in 1937 that, by not settling Kosovo, the state was neglecting its own interests and was working against itself. He maintained this sobering view after the Second World War as well but, except for insulting and fierce attacks by Shiptar secessionists on his character, there were no reactions of any other kind. One cannot and should not overlook the powerful public resonance of the declaration of the famous writer, later for a short time also president of Yugoslavia, Dobrica Cosic, at the 14th session of the Party leadership of Serbia in 1968, given under the title "A criticism of the ruling ideological conception of the national question'. His words struck deep at the Party establishment in Serbia and Yugoslavia and they brought serious repercussions for him but they also contributed to Dobrica Cosic meriting the title of being the greatest and most significant Serbian dissident. One should not pass over some of his statements and prescient warnings from that time. Citing only some excerpts from the aforementioned speech delivered on the 29th of May 1968, that is, more than a century ago, we experience his farsightedness today as an insulting neglect of the truth with the ominous consequences which are still stalking us now. The text which follows was also published in his book Stvarno i moguce (The real and the possible) in 1982 when the possible was being rapidly approached and I am reproducing parts of text because the possible has come to pass: "... I think that it is not possible to know how widespread is the belief that the formula 'self-managing rights and the self management of nations', in the name of state sovereignty as an expression of equality, in the name of nationality as a social priority, in the name of territorial autonomy, bears the concept of a primitive, disintegrated, particularised, inevitably bureaucratised and poverty-stricken society." "...A thorough and objective analysis has not been made of the political situation in the provinces, particularly Kosovo and Metohia, a situation which, judging by all that is known, is burdened with severe problems and some regressive tendencies. We can no longer not know how widespread is the conviction in Serbia of the worsening of relations between Shiptars and Serbs, of the sense of imperilment felt by Serbs and Montenegrins, of the wishes of skilled people to leave Kosovo and Metohia, of inequality before the courts and the lack of respect for the rule of law, of blackmail and extortion in the name of national affiliation." "...the true extent of the chauvinistic mood and nationalistic psychosis among the Shiptar people is not seen; the irredentist and separatist mood and aspirations among certain segments of the Shiptar nation is unjustifiably underestimated. Political truth is thereby not only being betrayed but an essentially problematic broad mindedness of the 'representative of the so- called bigger nation' is being displayed whereby the equality of the Shiptar people is being morally impoverished, equality in the responsibility for the progress and fate of the Republic of Serbia and of Yugoslavia, responsibility for co-operation and a common life together." "...In the present conditions in the Kosovo and Metohia area only two forms of statehood are possible - Yugoslav and Albanian, that is, one or the other. A combination of the two having positive consequences is not possible, at least, not in the present circumstances." "...The Serbs and Montenegrins did not usurp Kosovo and Metohia nor did they wrest them from the Shiptars in war and, consequently, they are neither occupiers nor conquerors. Kosovo and Metohia is the ancient and original homeland of the Serbian people.The Serbs cannot today base their national policy in Kosovo and Metohia on historical rights nor, naturally, on the concept of the Pec Patriarchate nor by retaining the present socio-political form and situation at any price. On the contrary. But the Shiptars of Kosovo and Metohia should also not forget that Serbs have lived together with them in Kosovo and Metohia for centuries, that the great works of medieval Serbian culture and the national liberation myth were created in this area, that the Serbian people made great sacrifices and gave an enormous amount for the liberation and advancement of Kosovo and Metohia, that nearly three hundred thousand Serbs and Montenegrins live there." These are typical extracts from his speech but, instead of any kind of conclusion, here are the accompanying comments to the cited speech which are published in Cosic's book: "Delivered on May 29th 1968 at the 14th session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists (SK) of Serbia at which inter-national relations within the Socialist Republic (SR) of Serbia were discussed. The leading political functionaries of the SR of Serbia and all speakers at this session fiercely attacked and condemned this speech as grossly nationalist, socially irresponsible and politically false. The speech of Jovan Marjanovic, professor of contemporary history who died in 1981 was also condemned." There was also Jovan Sotra, writer of the famous letter to Tito about the situation in Kosovo and Metohia which made it impossible for anybody, least of all from the state leadership, to try to argue as a justification for their policies that there was no data about the happenings in Kosovo and Metohia or that "the factual state on the ground has still not been suffciently studied", a phrase which was often used for a lack of action or for the suppression of the facts. Also worthy of mention are the names of Milos Sekulic, Blazo Radonjic, Novica Stojanovic and especially Kadri Reufi;, a functionary of Turkish origin who together with the aforementioned and many other Serbs defended the rights of the Serbs and who defended the rights of his own Turkish people threatened by the onset of Albanian national chauvinism which at that time, at the beginning of the 1 970s, was in full flight in parallel with the nationalist movements in the western republics of Yugoslavia. It would not be good to leave someone out but, nevertheless, only those are mentioned here whose words or deeds were clearly distinguished in the maelstrom created by the frenzy and deafening hullabaloo of the Shiptar secessionists which would reach a crescendo with the cry "Kosovo - Republic". The aforementioned personalities were bulwarks in the defence which prevented a breach in the walls but they could not alter the course or tide of events, the time for that had not yet come. That arrived with the April days of 1987. On those days, the 24th and 25th of April 1987, Kosovo was visited by Slobodan Milosevic in his capacity as the president of the presidency of the Central Committee of the SK of Serbia. During his talks with representatives (citizens of Serbian nationality) from Kosovo Polje, Gnjilane, Vitina, Klina and other places, fighting broke out, in fact an attack by baton-wielding police in an attempt to disperse the crowd which had gathered in front of the building in order to follow the talks between their representatives and Milosevic. It is necessary to understand the circumstances in which that gathering was held. It was one of the very rare talks at the highest level which had been held with the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia for years. The gathering consisted of citizens who wanted to express their dissatisfaction with their status and the treatment shown them, especially by leading Shiptars. To put it simply, this was a call and a demand for protection. It is clear that Milosevic found himself at the right place and that the stance he took and the declaration that he made launched the people on a campaign which led to fundamental changes not only in Kosovo itself but to changes which marked a watershed in the later state and political orientation of Serbia. The newspaper, Politika, portrayed this, among other things, in a short text thus: "... Slobodan Milosevic sought to appeal to the people. There were no loudspeakers. The president of the Party went out to meet the crowd which was shouting "they are beating us, they are beating us!" To that Slobodan Milosevic replied "Nobody has the right to beat the people!" And then he declared "The use of batons does not come into consideration. The police aren't here to keep some kind of order, you yourselves are keeping it." In his speech on that occasion Slobodan Milosevic said, among other things: "You're not going to abandon your land, are you, just because it is difficult to live there, because you have been forced to by injustice and oppression? It has never been in the spirit of the Serbian and Montenegrin people to yield in the face of obstacles, to become demoralised when it is necessary to fight, to become demoralised when the going gets tough." This is a short but quintessential portrayal of the most important aspects of that crucial event. We have emphasised the sentence which was most often to be quoted later. This is also very understandable because this was the first time after forty or so years that something was said which in a very specific way denied the established policy, a policy which was not even publicly mentioned. It seems to us, however, that this was not only the denial of a policy but that the real meaning of this cry was a call for democracy because to free the citizens of a country from repression, from the very fear of repression, is undoubtedly a significant step towards to democracy. Strongly critical of the "growth of Serbian nationalism" in their consideration of the "situation in Yugoslavia", many people (primarily politicians and journalists) stressed that these events as well as those which followed were the heralds of new waves of anti-Yugoslavism, anti- Communism and anti-Titoism and the return of Serbian Orthodoxy and similiar things - in short, great changes. It seems, however, that one significant aspect of the new conception of the role which the Serbian population in Kosovo and Metohia displayed soon after these events was minimised. This was the self-awareness, renewal and rejuvenation which led the citizens of that province onto the political stage even outside their territory and with their departure on protest meetings to Vojvodina in the north of Yugoslavia in 1989 they made a significant contribution to the movement which the Croatian and Slovenian readerships termed the "yoghourt revolution" and which led to constitutional changes of which the most important was the change of the absurd status of Serbia in Yugoslavia, that is, that the decisions of the majority of the Serbian people in Serbia depended on the consent given, or denied, them by the autonomous provinces. With the reduction of their autonomy to making decisions which affected only themselves and not the whole, the unified action of Serbia within the framework of Yugoslavia was made possible. This together with other changes which primarily related to personalities would bring an end to a period in which Serbia was the hostage of the decisions of the national minorities in her autonomous provinces which had had until then the incomprehensible right of veto over all decisions of the federal authorities. To conclude this short review of those crucial events and not to say that there was resistance both fierce and not so strong to this kind of resolution of the problem would be an oversight. Clearly the fiercest resistance came from the Shiptars and their mostly illegal organisations. Many in their ranks understood that their activities were at low ebb and so they tried to avert this with noisy action. Less strong but more subtle were the objections of political opponents from within the Serbian ranks who stigmatised these actions as being populist, nationalist and the rule of the mob. Their attitude sprang from the conviction that this modus operandi did not correspond with the needs and aims of democracy. Responses to this followed, of course, but it was important that these dialogues cleared the way for the development and establishment of the pluralism of ideas which is a very good foundation for democracy.